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Is the Group Home "Like a
Pig in the Parlor?"*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recorded history of mental retardation predates defined knowl-
edge of many other areas of disability.1 Descriptions of mental re-
tardation, for example, are included in the writings of Hippocrates
and Confucius. 2 With such a lengthy record of attention, it is inter-
esting that society continues to have difficulties dealing with this
handicap. Disparate views regarding appropriate housing of the
mentally retarded have resulted in increased litigation during re-
cent years.3 Specifically, courts have been asked to determine
whether mentally retarded persons, who cannot live alone, have a
right to reside in community group homes.4
Nebraska, although a leader in the field of agency placement
services for the mentally retarded,5 has not been immune to this
wave of litigation. A recent state district court case, Knudtson v.
Trainor (Trendwood),6 demonstrates that Nebraska's progressive
state agencies are not the entire solution to the dilemma of caring
for the mentally retarded and assimilating them into the commu-
nity. Although the trial court's decision in Trendwood represented
a victory for advocates of the rights of the mentally handicapped in
* Justice Sutherland noted in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), which upheld the right of cities to restrictively
zone their neighborhoods, that "a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. at 388.
1. P. CHINN, C. DREW & D. LOGAN, MENTAL RETARDATION, A LIFE-CYCLE AP-
PROACH 4 (2d ed. 1979).
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 42-162 and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Comment, Can The Mentally Retarded Enjoy "Yards That Are Wide?," 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982). See Mason & Menolascino, The Right to
Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific
Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mason &
Menoloascino].
6. No. 364-133, Memorandum order (D. Lancaster County, Neb. Nov. 1, 1982).
Trendwood is the name of the real estate subdivision the plaintiffs'
represented.
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Nebraska,7 their battle is not finished as the case is currently on
appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Not surprisingly, the strongest resistance to the establishment
of community group homes has come from private homeowners.
These homeowners argue that residential zoning restrictions and
deeded restrictive covenants prohibit the operation of group
homes in their neighborhoods.8 The methods by which other state
courts have disposed of this issue9 have not been consistent.'0 In
some states, legislatures have resolved the issue by enacting stat-
utes which preempt local zoning ordinances." However, at least
one state statute has been successfully challenged by a municipal-
ity with a restrictive zoning ordinance.12
Despite this inconsistent treatment, there appears to be a trend
permitting the establishment of group homes. This Comment will
demonstrate that in light of the trend of litigation in other states
Trendwood was correctly decided. In doing so, the rationale un-
derlying the decisions affecting the mentally retarded's housing
will be explored as will the arguments put forth by both the advo-
cates of the mentally retarded and the homeowners who oppose
the infiltration of group homes into their communities.
II. THE TRENDWOOD DECISION
On October 5, 1982, the Lancaster County Office of Mental Re-
tardation leased a house from Trainor Investments. The purpose
of the lease was the establishment of a group home' 3 for five men-
tally retarded women. Charles and Esther Knudtson, neighbors of
the Trainor home, brought a lawsuit to enjoin such a use of the
7. The trial court ruled in favor of allowing the group home to operate in the
Trendwood development, a residential community of other citizens. See in-
fra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Leland Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. R.T. Partnership, 106 Mich. App.
790, 308 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for
Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1976).
9. Id.
10. Compare Leland Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. R.T. Partnership, 106 Mich.
App. 790, 398 N.W.2d 648 (1981) with Palm Beach Hosp., Inc., v. West Palm
Beach, 2 Mental Disability L Rep. 18 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
11. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
12. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
13. A group home is defined by statute as:
[A] facility licensed by the State of Nebraska in which at least four
but not more than eight persons not including resident managers or
house parents, who are unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption re-
side while receiving therapy, training, or counseling for the purposes
of adaptation to living with, or rehabilitation from cerebral palsy, au-
tism, or mental retardation.
NEB. RE V. STAT. § 18-1744 (Supp. 1982).
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Trainor home. Contending that the establishment of a group home
violated the use covenants which were drafted and recorded in
1963 when the Trendwood lots were platted,14 the plaintiffs' put
forth two arguments. First, the plaintiffs' claimed that the group
home operation violated a restrictive covenant that limited the use
of the property to residential purposes.15 Second, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the occupation of a house by five retarded, unrelated
adult women, who would receive therapy, training, and counseling
and who would require paid houseparents, violated a restrictive
covenant that only allowed single-family dwellings.' 6
The defendants 17 argued that: (1) restrictive covenants are not
favored, and, if ambiguous, they should be construed in a manner
permitting the maximum unrestricted use of the property;18
(2) the covenants only limited the use of the property to residen-
tial use as distinguished from commercial use;19 (3) the restriction
of the property's use to a single-family dwelling only limited the
type of building constructed and not the use of the building;20
(4) the term "family" does not necessarily refer only to persons
related through consanguinity and marriage;2 1 (5) the covenants
were being misconstrued by the plaintiffs in an attempt to discrim-
inate on the basis of mental disability;22 and (6) the plaintiffs had
14. The protective covenants for the Trendwood area provided that:
No lot shall be used except for residential purpose. No building shall
be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other
than one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two and one-
half stories in height, and a private garage.
Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133 (D. Lancaster County, Neb.
Nov. 1, 1982) (order denying injunction at 4).
15. The plaintiffs argued that the house would be operated more like a business
enterprise, such as a boarding house, than a residence. They claimed that the
home would have to be licensed by the state, the residents would pay as
much as they were able to afford, and the houseparents would be paid to
supervise the women. Therefore, the plaintiffs' concluded that the defend-
ants' group home use was not for residential purposes as required by the
covenant. Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133 (D. Lancaster
County, Neb. Nov. 1, 1982) (plaintiffs' brief at 6-9).
16. Id. at 9-13. The plaintiffs argued that the covenant restricting construction to
single-family dwellings related to the use of the property as well as the struc-
ture. Thus, they claimed that the facility was the equivalent of an outpatient
clinic or mini-hospital. Id.
17. The list of defendants included Michael and Marie Trainor, d/b/a Trainor In-
vestments; Lancaster County Office of Mental Retardation (LOMR); Lancas-
ter County; and the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners.
18. Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133 (D. Lancaster County, Neb.
Nov. 1, 1982) (defendants' brief at 2).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 9. The Lincoln Municipal Code specifically prohibits discrimination on
the basis of mental disability: "It shall be unlawful to: ... (b) Discriminate
[Vol. 62:742
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waived their rights to enforce the restrictive covenants. 23
The district court refused to enjoin the use of the house as a
group home.24 In its opinion, the court emphasized the fact that
the women would live together and function as a family unit; they
would share common areas of the house, prepare and eat meals
together, and learn only those skills that are normally taught in the
home--cleaning, cooking, personal hygiene, and money manage-
ment. In essence, the house would look no different from any
other house in the neighborhood. In addition, the court noted that
the public policy of the state of Nebraska is to promote the estab-
lishment of facilities to meet the needs of the mentally retarded.25
Thus, based on these conclusions, as well as the fact that the plain-
tiffs could not demonstrate injury, the court refused to grant an
injunction.
MII. WHY HAVE COMMUNITY HOMES?
The fortunes and misfortunes of the mentally retarded have
been wrought with tragic variation in past years. Constant
changes in the theories on the best modes of treatment, changes in
social and economic conditions, and increased medical knowledge
about the pathophysiology of mental retardation have all "made
their mark" on the history of treatment of the mentally retarded.26
Because they were feared to be witches, the mentally retarded
members of the Puritan culture were hanged and burned.27 In the
early 1900's when the Darwinian view of "survival of the fittest"
was a prominent social theory,2 s the mentally retarded were con-
sidered to be defective, immoral, and of a criminal nature. As a
result, some people went so far as to propose that all such "defec-
tives be put to death."29
against any person in the terms, conditions, privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling ... because of.. .disability." LINCOLN, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE,
§ 11.06.030 (1980).
23. Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133 (D. Lancaster County, Neb.
Nov. 1, 1982) (defendants' brief at 10). The house was previously occupied by
five to six unrelated college students, and no suit had been filed to prevent
them from living together. Id. at 12.
24. Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133 (D. Lancaster County, Neb.
Nov. 1, 1982) (order denying injunction at 14).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1141 (1981).
26. Begab, The Mentally Retarded and Society: Trends and Issues in THE MEN-
TALLY RETARDED AND SOCIETY: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 4 (M. Begab &
S. Richardson eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Begab].
27. Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People'". Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Re-
strictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767,
769 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lippincott].
28. See Begab, supra note 26, at 6.
29. Id. Many states passed laws that restricted marriage and provided for com-
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Historically, the mentally retarded were perceived as lacking
ambition, individualism, and independence. Instead, they had
"'weaknesses and deficiencies' "30 that society was unwilling to
tolerate. Thus, long term warehousing of such persons in the ho-
mogeneous setting of custodial institutions, away from the main-
stream of society, became the norm.31 For many years "'out of
sight, out of mind' " 32 was the accepted philosophy for dealing with
the mentally retarded.33
Social awareness of the enormity of the mental retardation
problem increased substantially during World War I. Intelligence
tests made their debut, and their administration to army troops
yielded shocking results. To the suprise of many, an alarming
number of soldiers demonstrated subnormal mental productiv-
ity.34 As a result of the increasing awareness of the problem of
mental retardation, better methods of dealing with the mentally
retarded were sought. Gradually, antipathy toward automatic in-
stitutionalization of the mentally retarded grew. 35 Only recently
has it been recognized that large institutions merely "protect" soci-
ety from the retarded and do not provide for the personal growth
and development of their mentally retarded residents. 36
pulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded or feeble minded. Under the
holding of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), such statutes constituted a proper
exercise of the states' police power. Buck was a "feeble minded white wo-
man" who was committed to a state colony for the feeble minded. She was
the daughter of a feeble minded mother and the mother of an illegitimate,
feeble minded child. In affirming the lower court's order to perform a salpin-
gectomy upon the plaintiff, Justice Holmes made the infamous statement
that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
Nebraska has not had statutory regulation of sterilization of the mentally
retarded since 1969. See O'Neal, Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded in
MENTAL DisA ary LAw IN NEB. 76 (1976).
30. Begab, supra note 26, at 5. "Whether these weaknesses are indigenous to the
individual is a matter for continuing debate and research if not for the se-
verely handicapped person, at least for the mildly retarded, disadvantaged,
who are without demonstrable central nervous system pathology." Id.
31. E. KATZ, THE RETARDED ADULT IN THE CoMMUNrrY 21 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as E. KATZ].
32. Begab, supra note 26, at 5.
33. For a history of the theories and the treatment of the mentally retarded see
Mason & Menoloascino, supra note 5.
34. Begab, supra note 26, at 5.
35. Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst
Case, 31 STAN. L. REv. 717, 723 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ferleger & Boyd].
36. Cronin, Initial Steps in Creating a Community Home, in ComMuNrrY HOMES
FOR THE RETARDED 1 (J. Bergman ed. 1975). "The rigid routines established in
any institution, necessary for the maintenance and care of large numbers of
individuals by small numbers of staff, contribute to a loss of self-image and
more dependency for those individuals." Id.
At one time, the Nebraska statutes stated that the objectives of institu-
tions included providing custodial care and segregation of the mentally defi-
[Vol. 62:742
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In recent years, progress has been achieved toward the deinsti-
tutionalization of, and providing humane habilitation for, mentally
disabled persons.37 The goal of deinstitutionalization is "normali-
zation." Normalization, the antithesis of institutionalization, ex-
poses the mentally retarded to experiences and conditions of
everyday living that allow individuals to learn acceptable behav-
ior.38 Normalization requires that disabled persons who are un-
able to live with their families reside in community residential
facilities of normal size in normal neighborhoods. 3 9 The merit of
such living arrangements arguably results from the opportunities
for normal societal integration, observation of "normal" residents
of the area, and peer interaction which are provided therein.40
Community based homes offer the retarded individual an op-
portunity to become a productive member of society. For example,
a community home may offer employment training whereby many
individuals become independent, self-supporting taxpayers, rather
than tax liabilities.41
IV. JUDICIAL BASIS FOR DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
Although deinstitutionalization is a laudable movement, it must
be admitted that initially few state legislatures voluntarily em-
cient from society. Mason & Menolascino, .supra note 5, at 133 n. 21; Law of
Apr. 25, 1921, ch. 241, § 1, 1921 Laws of Neb. 843, as amended, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 83-218 (1981).
37. Habilitation has been defined as:
[T]he process... which... assists the... [individual] to acquire
and maintain those life skills which enable him to cope more effec-
tively with the demands of his own person and of his environment
and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency.
Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, struc-
tured education and treatment.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395, (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See Willer, Scheerenberger & Intag-
liata, Deinstitutionalization and Mentally Retarded Persons, in INTEGRATION
OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS INTO THE CoMMuNITY 3-4, (A.
Novak & L. Heal eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Willer].
38. Willer, supra note 37 at 4. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1353.
39. Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project of the ABA Commission
on the Mentally Disabled, Zoningfor Community Homes 1 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA Project].
40. While living in group homes, the retarded can learn by observation of normal
behavior. On the other hand, if placed in an institution their only role models
may be persons who have been similarly institutionalized for abnormal be-
havior. Thus, their abnormal development is reinforced. See Pieper & Cap-
puccilli, Beyond the Family and the Institution The Sanctity of Liberty, in
ACHIEVEMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (T.
Apolloni, J. Cappuccilli, & T. Cooke eds. 1980); Begab, supra note 26, at 18-19.
41. ABA Project, supra note 39, at 1. For a thorough discussion of the advantages
gained from living in a group home, see E. KATz, supra note 31.
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braced this goal.42 This lack of legislative and executive action re-
sulted in increased mental health litigation which in turn provided
the major impetus for normalization.43
Nebraska's federal district court litigated the deinstitutionaliza-
tion issue in the habilitation suit of Horacek v. Exon.44 In a civil
rights action brought against the state of Nebraska on behalf of the
mentally retarded children at the Beatrice State Home, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the conditions of confinement at the institution
were violative of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs argued that community
facilities, which were less restrictive than institutionalization,
were available; therefore, commitment to the Beatrice State Home
was a violation of due process. 45
Horacek was resolved through a consent decree in which the
parties agreed that retarded citizens of Nebraska have the same
constitutional rights as all other citizens, including the right to ade-
quate care and habilitation. 6 Specifically, the decree stated that:
Mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to adequate care
42. Comment, Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Retarded in Maine: The Inevita-
ble Face-off With Zoning, 35 ME. L. REV. 33, 35 (1983).
43. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub noW. Wy-
att v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the only constitu-
tional justification for involuntary commitment of a retardate is habilitation.
Therefore, once committed, the retardate has a constitutional right to ade-
quate and meaningful habilitation. Also, stating that placement which is less
restrictive than institutionalization must be considered prior to commit-
ment); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (patients have a
right to treatment in facilities less restrictive than institutions; jurisdictions
accordingly have a duty to create less restrictive settings); Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976) (nonconsensual hospitaliza-
tion statute authorizing confinement of an individual solely because that per-
son may be mentally ill or habituated to the excessive use of drugs or alcohol,
to an extent requiring hospitalization held unconstitutional because no dan-
gerousness requirement included in the commitment process); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.
N.Y. 1973) (institutional residents have a constitutional right to be protected
from harm).
Two Supreme Court decisions have circumscribed the authority of the
states to confine the mentally disabled. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975) (a state cannot constitutionally confine nondangerous persons who are
capable of living without institutionalization); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972) (a person charged with a criminal offense who is committed solely on
account of incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reason-
able period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future).
44. Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973).
45. 357 F. Supp. at 72. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's failure to place
them in less restrictive community facilities deprived them of the minimum
level of constitutionally required habitation.
46. The decree included the following stipulations:
[Vol. 62:742
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and habilitation. Habilitation has been defined as the maximum opportu-
nity for normal living based on the needs and abilities of an individual.
Mentally retarded persons thus have a right to be served in the least re-
strictive and most normalizing setting possible.4 7
Thus, it was recognized that mentally retarded citizens were capa-
ble of growth and learning.4 8
Although Nebraska has recognized the aforementioned consti-
tutional rights of the mentally retarded,49 and various federal
courts have ruled that institutionalized retardates have a constitu-
tional right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment,5 0
the following paragraphs show that the United States Supreme
Court has not held that such a constitutional right exists.
For example, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man,5 1 the United States Supreme Court held that the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 5 2 did not
create a right to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive envi-
1. Mentally retarded persons have the same constitutional rights as
all other citizens.
2. Mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to adequate
care and habilitation. Habilitation has been defined as the maxi-
mum opportunity for normal living based on the needs and abili-
ties of an individual. Mentally retarded persons thus have a right
to be served in the least restrictive and most normalizing setting
possible.
3. Mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to be free
from harm.
4. The population of the Beatrice State Developmental Center
would be reduced to 250 persons within three years as a goal sub-
ject to further expert determination.
5. Mentally retarded persons at the Beatrice State Developmental
center and the State Regional Centers, who are capable of being
appropriately cared for and habilitated in Nebraska community
based programs, must be transferred to such programs as quickly
as possible.
7. The development of community based programs would continue.
MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION, ALoCOoLsM AND DRUG DEPENDENCY
HANDBOOK .. .: THE CoUNTY OFFICLAis GUIDE TO NEBRASKA LAw, SYSTEM
AND SERVICES 81 (2d ed. June, 1978) (prepared by the Mental Health Law
Projected for County Officials) [hereinafter cited as MENTAL HEALTH: THE
CoUNTY OFFIcIALS GUIDE].
47. Id.
48. Authorities moved swiftly to implement the terms of the Horacek decree. In
1976, the legislature appropriated $1,000,000 to facilitate movement of resi-
dents from the Beatrice facility into community based programs. Between
1976 and 1978, 140 residents were transferred. MENTAL HEALTH: THE CouNTYr
OFFIcLALs GUIDE, supra note 46, at 81-82. See Mason & Menolascino, supra
note 5, at 164-66.
49. See supra text accompanying note 47.
50. See supra note 43.
51. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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ronment. Halderman, a minor retarded resident of Pennhurst,
fied suit against the inadequate, overcrowded, and understaffed
institution.53 At issue was whether the lack of adequate habilita-
tion caused the Pennhurst residents to suffer violations of their
constitutional rights.54 The district court held that the eighth5 5 and
fourteenth 56 amendments provided the residents with the right to
freedom from physical harm; the right to the least restrictive mode
of alternative care; and the right to nondiscriminatory, minimally
adequate habilitation. The district court then ordered Pennhurst
closed.57 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's order but did so on the grounds that the states had an af-
firmative statutory obligation to provide appropriate treatment.
The constitutional claims were avoided.5 8
53. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.
Penn. 1978). Like many others, the institution had been founded in the early
1900's. Seventy-four percent of the residents were severely to profoundly re-
tarded. The average length of residence was twenty-one years. The place
was very impersonal, and residents were housed in large overcrowded wards.
Id. at 1302-03. The defendants admitted that the institutions was inappropri-
ate and inadequate to habilitate the residents. Id. at 1304.
54. The district court opinion detailed numerous incidents of resident abuse and
injury, including rape by staff members, filthy living conditions, unrestricted
usage of restraints, and lack of adequate training programs. Id. at 1302-13.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment states in pertinent part that
"[ejxcessive bail shall not be required ... nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." Id.
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The applicable portion of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides that "[n] o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
57. 446 F. Supp. at 1317-22. The court stated "[W]henever a state accepts re-
tarded individuals into its facilities, it cannot create or maintain those facili-
ties in a manner which deprives those individuals of the basic necessities of
life. In the case of the retarded, this constitutes an obligation to provide them
with minimally adequate habilitation." Id. at 1318.
58. 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979) The court held that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
mandated appropriate habilitation in the least restrictive setting, and that
state law provided a right to treatment. In particular, the court based its
holding on § 6010, the "bill of rights" provision. It states in relevant part:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to ap-
propriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such
disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with
developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize
the developmental potential of the person and should be pro-
vided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obliga-
tion to assure that public funds are not provided to any insti-
[Vol. 62:742
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Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Supreme Court in reversing the
appellate court's decision.5 9 The Court held that the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not grant enti-
tlement to treatment in the least restrictive environment. Again,
the constitutional issues were not reached.60
The Supreme Court had a second opportunity to rule on the
constitutional rights of the institutionalized mentally retarded in
Youngberg v. Romeo.61 In Romeo, suit was brought under section
198362 to recover damages from institutional officials who failed to
initiate appropriate preventative procedures to protect Romeo
from harming himself and other residents. Romeo claimed that
the lack of preventative procedures violated his rights under the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 63 Romeo also alleged that he
was subjected to prolonged restraint in violation of his right to
freedom of movement6 and that he had not been supplied with
adequate habilitation.65
In the district court, the Romeo jury was instructed that the
case was governed by the eighth amendment. A verdict was re-
turned for the officials.6 6 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded the case, holding that the eighth amendment
was an inappropriate basis for judicial review of the rights of the
involuntarily committed. Instead, the court determined that the
tutional or other residential program for persons with
developmental disabilities that-
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation
which is appropriate to the needs of such persons ....
59. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
60. The Court found that the bill of rights section was void of language on which
to rule that compliance with § 6010 was a condition to be met by states before
they would receive federal funding under the Act. Other sections of the Act
did make the receipt of funds conditional. Thus, "[t] he existence of explicit
conditions throughout the Act, and the absence of conditional language in
§ 6010, manifest the limited meaning of § 6010." Id. at 23.
On remand, the third circuit held that Pennsylvania law provided ade-
quate support for the deinstitutionalization order and that the mentally re-
tarded had the right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982).
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the
issue of whether the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal court from or-
dering state officials to undertake such costly relief solely on the basis of
state law. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 103 S. Ct. 203
(1982).
61. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
63. Romeo had suffered injuries on at least 70 occasions. Romeo v. Youngberg,
644 F.2d 147, 155 (3rd Cir. 1980).
64. Id. at 155.
65. Id. at 164.
66. Id. at 156.
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liberty interest embodied in the fourteenth amendment provided
the right to be free from undue bodily restraint, to personal secur-
ity and protection, and to adequate treatment.67
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded the case.68 The Court upheld the claimed rights to free-
dom from restraint and freedom from harm. Both rights involved
liberty interests that were protected by substantive due process. 69
On the issue of the right to treatment, the Court did not address
the constitutionality of a state's total failure to provide treatment
to a committed indiidual. Furthermore, the Court left unan-
swered the question of whether institutional residents have a con-
stitutional right to the habilitation necessary to preserve or
improve basic skills. The Court's narrow holding merely provided
that the involuntarily committed person has a due process liberty
interest that requires the state to provide the minimally adequate
training necessary to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint.7 0
In light of Pennhurst and Romeo, it appears that a large number
of mental retardates will remain institutionalized unless states
continue to work toward deinstitutionalization. Until the Supreme
Court clearly rejects or affirms the question of a due process right
to habilitation, courts will have to continue relying on state
grounds to order adequate habilitation.71
V. OPPOSITION TO THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
MOVEMENT
A. Community Resistance
Regardless of how carefully conceived social reform may be,
and despite state and federal support, local opposition may pose a
seemingly insurmountable obstacle to implementation of reform
measures.
72
The lagging deinstitutionalization 73 movement reveals that the
manner in which society perceives the retarded individual has not
67. Id. at 159.
68. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
69. 102 S. Ct. at 2458. These two interests have long been recognized as falling
under the auspices of the due process clause.
70. 102 S. Ct. at 2461-62.
71. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text; supra note 60.
72. Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use Conflicts and Plan-
ning Imperatives, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 137, 137-38 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kressel].
73. Anti-institutionalization is the belief that incarceration of the mentally dis-




kept pace with the increased knowledge held by mental health
professionals regarding mental retardation. The idea that most
mentally retarded individuals can and should live in the commu-
nity is freely promoted. However, it is one thing to proclaim this
policy and quite another to implement it. Even while individuals
profusely deny any feeling of prejudice toward the mentally re-
tarded, their own communities resist the incorporation of the re-
tarded into the community.74 Thus, many nonprejudicial
objections to the establishment of group homes are encountered
by state officials who attempt to place a home in a neighborhood.
For example, communities might express fear that crime rates
will climb, property values will decline, traffic will increase, and
the residential character of the neighborhood will be destroyed.
With respect to crime rates, studies have shown that evidence does
not support claims of crime increase in neighborhoods with group
homes. 75 The fear that property values will decline has also been
disproved. 76 Likewise, traffic should not increase as it is unlikely
that the retarded group home residents will drive. Finally, the in-
troduction of a group home into an area will likely not appreciably
change the character of the neighborhood. The group home is cre-
ated to resemble a family, and it is unlikely that the residents will
interact with the other community residents to a substantial
degree.
Another fear of the community members results from the per-
ceived adverse effects of exposure to, and interaction with, the
mentally retarded or "undesirables." 77 The key to resolving this
74. In the Trendwood case, the plaintiffs' brief stated: 'The plaintiffs are not tak-
ing the position that mentally retarded persons are not permitted to reside
within the subdivision.... ." Knudtson v. Trainor (Trendwood), No. 364-133
(D. Lancaster County Neb. 1982) (plaintiffs' brief at 12). See Sigelman,
Spanhel & Lorenzen, Community Reactions to Deinstitutionalization: Crime,
Property Values, and Other Bugbears, 45 J. REHABILrrArON 52 (1979).
A study made by the President's Commission on Mental Health revealed
that 85 percent of the general population expressed a lack of objections to the
establishment of a group home on their block. In reality, approximately 33%
of the group homes established have encountered community opposition. Id.
75. See Kressel, supra note 72, at 145.
76. Id. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 2 n.10.
77. Even if not afraid for themselves, parents of children may be concerned for
their safety and wary of their exposure to deviant role models. For example,
in one case the plaintiff homeowners who opposed the defendant's group
home in their neighborhood alleged that:
It] he presence of defendant's pupils at its school or institution and in
the village will ... cause close and intimate contact between said
mental defectives and plaintiffs and plaintiffs' children, and that such
daily contact and the action and mannerisms of said mental defec-
tives will have profound, deleterious, depressing effect upon the
minds, hearts, emotions and nervous systems of... plaintiffs' chil-
dren ... and the health of the plaintiffs' children will thereby be im-
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problem is public education and careful screening of the group
home residents so that aggressive individuals have adequate su-
pervision.78 The fact that deinstitutionalization requires commu-
nity changes, however, continues to nourish community
resistance.
B. Conflict with Zoning Ordinances And Restrictive Deed Covenants
These community fears by themselves do not provide an ade-
quate basis for a lawsuit to prevent the establishment of a group
home. Homeowners cannot successfully argue that the home
should not be located in their neighborhood because they are
prejudiced against the mentally retarded. Consequently, other
tools are used to fight the placement of such homes. These tools
include the use of zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants.
Constitutional approval of local land use regulation through
zoning was held to be a legitimate exercise of the police power in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 79 The Court noted that local
zoning ordinances are upheld unless they are "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." 80
The authority to regulate land use is most frequently exercised
by local governments. Zoning ordinances are the most common
method of regulating land use, dividing cities into commercial, in-
dustrial, and residential areas.8 1 One type of zoning is an exclu-
sionary ordinance which specifically excludes individuals with
certain identifiable characteristics from residing in an area.82 This
type of zoning restriction may be used by communities as a means
to frustrate the establishment of community homes. Note, how-
ever, that exclusionary zoning laws are rare and serious questions
paired; that the presence of these numerous mental defectives in the
midst ... of the village... and their close and intimate contact with
the average normal child of plaintiffs will unfortunately and of neces-
sity give rise to many unpleasant incidents....
Rogers v. Ass'n for the Help of Retarded Children, 308 N.Y. 126, 129-30, 123
N.E.2d 806, 807-08 (1954).
78. Kressel, supra note 72, at 146. Research has shown, however, that once
placed in a neighborhood, group homes tend to be accepted by the neighbors.
Nelson & Burgdorf, Housing and Zoning Restrictions, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 704 (R. Burgdorf, Jr. ed. 1980).
79. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
80. Id. at 395.
81. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 1. As a method of land use control, zoning
infringes upon personal property rights. However, this infringement is tem-
pered by the fact that homeowners can rely on community development in a
homogeneous manner and not have to worry about intrusion of industry into
a residential area.
82. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 2.
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exist regarding their constitutionality.8 3
A more prevalent zoning ordinance used by a community at-
tempting to prevent the establishment of a group home is the sin-
gle-family dwelling ordinance. Such an ordinance is designed to
limit residential areas to single-family structures containing only
single families as opposed to multiple families, boarding houses,
fraternities, and other groups of individuals. 84 Landowners argue
that group homes violate such an ordinance because they house a
number of unrelated people who do not comprise a "family."
Restrictive deed covenants have also been used by homeown-
ers to argue against establishment of group homes. This was one
of the arguments employed by the Trendwood homeowners.
Since the objectives of private covenants and municipal zoning
are similar and the arguments put forth by jurisdictional govern-
ment bodies and homeowners generally apply to both, the discus-
sion of restrictive covenants and zoning ordinances will be jointly
presented. The major thrust of the homeowners' arguments is that
the members of group homes do not constitute a single family, and
therefore, the members' occupancy of a group home violates any
covenant that restricts use of land to single-family use. Closely in-
terwined with this contention is the assertion that, because a
group of mentally retarded residents do not make up a single fam-
ily, their use of a home is not a residential use but rather a com-
mercial use similar to a boarding house or fraternity.85 If the latter
argument is accepted, the establishment of group homes violates
both the restrictive covenants and the zoning ordinances that limit
use of specific areas to residential uses.
These assertions by homeowners, if successful, would effec-
tively exclude group homes from those neighborhoods most desir-
able for community homes-single-family residential districts.
However, if courts find that the group home residents comprise a
family, then the residential/commercial argument is easily re-
futed. Consequently, much of the litigation in this area has cen-
tered on the issue of whether the group home members constitute
a "family."
1. The Controversy Over Whether Group Home Residents
Constitute a "Family"
For the group home advocate, the foremost objective in the bat-
tle against adversarial neighbors is to have the group home resi-
83. Such an ordinance would almost certainly fail to overcome an equal protec-
tion challenge. Id.
84. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 2.
85. See, e.g.,.Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981).
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dents recognized as a "family." The issue is usually whether the
group home satisfies the definition of family as set out in the con-
tested ordinance or covenant. If family is narrowly defined by law,
this battle may be a difficult one. Furthermore, problems stem
from the United States Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,86 where the Court indicated that the zoning pow-
ers of jurisdictions are very broad.
In Belle Terre, a village ordinance restricted land use to single-
family dwellings. Family was defined in the ordinance as:
10] ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household
servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cook-
ing together as a single house-keeping unit though not related by blood,
adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.8 7
The Court upheld the local government's attempt to enforce the
single-family ordinance and ruled that it was a legitimate land use
regulation.8 8 As a result, a group of six unrelated college students
were prohibited from living together in that area.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,8 9 the Court indicated that
there were limits on how restrictive a housing ordinance could be.
The ordinance questioned in Moore contained an unusually com-
plicated definition of "family" such that a grandchild was prohib-
ited from residing in the same household with his grandmother,
her son, and another grandson.9 0 The City of East Cleveland ar-
gued that Belle Terre mandated that the ordinance be enforced.
The Court, however, found only a tenuous relationship between
the ordinance and any governmental objectives. Also, Belle Terre
affected unrelated individuals, whereas the ordinance in Moore af-
fected bloodline relatives. In light of this and the traditional pro-
tection afforded the sanctity of the family, the covenant in Moore
was not sustained.91
Not all ordinances and covenants are as specifically restrictive
as the one involved in Belle Terre. However, the fact that residents
of group homes are unrelated is a major basis of the arguments
86. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 8-9. The ordinance was contested on the grounds that it interfered with
the right to travel, that the village residents had no right to dictate social ho-
mogeneity, that it was a restriction on the lessee's privacy, and that it was of
no concern to village residents whether the lessees were married or not. The
Court found none of these elements present and stated: "A quiet place where
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs." Id. at 9.
89. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id. at 498-99.
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favoring exclusion of group homes from a community, and, since
Moore involved blood relatives, the Belle Terre barrier still stands.
Exclusionary zoning ordinances and dovenants range from the
very vague to the very specific. Some may merely restrict the use
of property to single-family use but leave that term undefined.
Others may specifically define the term "family" in terms of mari-
tal, sanguinous, or adoptive relationships. The wording of the ordi-
nance or covenant is often a critical factor in determining whether
group home residents comprise a family or not as slight variations
in wording may lead to differing results. Note that even though
Belle Terre ruled that restrictive zoning ordinances would be up-
held as long as there was no due process violation, state courts
have shown a willingness to find that group homes fit within these
restrictive definitions. 92
In three recent cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of group homes.9 3 In Leland Acres Homeowners Association
v. R.T. Partnership,4 the appellate court upheld the placement of
six mentally disabled individuals in a community foster care facil-
ity. The building and use restrictions for the subdivision stated:
"Each lot will be used for providing residential purposes only....
Such dwelling shall be designed and erected for occupation by a
single private family .... ,,95 The issue before the Leland court
was whether the group home residents were in fact a "single pri-
vate family"9 6 within the meaning of the ordinance so that the
group home could be allowed.
The court specifically examined the language of the covenant,
the profitability of the operation at issue, and the "basis of the affil-
iation of the residents in the home."97 The court reasoned that al-
though the covenant mandated residential use, the covenant
merely specified the type of structure to be erected. Furthermore,
the covenant did not specify who could use the dwelling.98 The
92. E.g., Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 59
A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1976) (public policy favored
establishment of group home for seven to twelve retarded children even
though zoning resolution defined family as being restricted to four unrelated
persons living together).
93. Leland Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. R.T. Partnership, 106 Mich. App. 790, 308
N.W.2d 648 (1981) (foster home for six mentally disabled adults); Malcom v.
Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980) (foster home for five men-
tally retarded adult women); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Systems
Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978) (foster home for up to six men-
tally retarded children).
94. 106 Mich. App. 790, 308 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
95. Id. at 792, 308 N.W.2d at 649.
96. Id.




court also noted that the home was run by a nonprofit charitable
corporation; thus, the home was not being used for commercial
purposes. 99 Finally, the home residents were perceived to have a
close familial relationship, not a temporary living arrangement
predicated on financial need or convenience.100
As a basis for this latter finding, the court relied heavily on its
earlier decision in Malcom v. Shamie.101 In Malcom the court
stated:
Five mentally retarded women living with a foster parent in an envi-
ronment therapeutically designed to emulate a more conventional family
environment should also be considered a family, and such use of the prop-
erty, an appropriate family residential use. The residents are more than a
group of unrelated individuals sharing a common roof. They do not have
natural families on which to rely, and, due to their unique circumstances,
it is unlikely that these women will ever rejoin their parents or marry and
form independent families. 102
Therefore, the court reasoned, the lack of a blood or marital rela-
tionship did not preclude the group home residents from being a
"family" within the terms of the covenant.
One of the arguments asserted by the Trendwood defendants,
that restrictive covenants are not favored by the law and thus will
be strictly construed, was the basis for the decision in the Wiscon-
sin case of Crowley v. Knapp.103 The covenant examined by the
Crowley court, like the one in the Trendwood case, did not define
"family." 04 The court held that it was against public policy to im-
pose a restriction upon land when that restriction was not ex-
pressly stated and public policy favored free and unrestricted use
of property. The court refused to find that "family," as stated in
the covenant, mandated a relationship by consanguinity or mar-
riage. 0 5 Further evidence of the court's distaste for restrictive cov-
99. Id. at 796, 308 N.W.2d at 652.
100. Id.
101. 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980).
102. Id. at 136, 290 N.W.2d at 103.
103. 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
104. The covenant stated:
(1) The use of said premises shall be restricted to the construction
of one single family dwelling, .. and shall be used for resi-
dential purposes only. ...
(7) No residence shall be constructed... which will house more
than one family.
(13) No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on or
conducted on the premises. ...
Id. at 431, 288 N.W.2d at 820.
105. Id. at 437, 288 N.W.2d at 823. See Missionaries of La Salette v. Whitefish Bay,
267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954) (group of priests and lay brothers residing
together did not violate covenant restricting use to family use).
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enants was shown by its ruling that the group home did not violate
commercial restrictions. 106 However, since covenants that run
with the land will generally be upheld unless they are discrimina-
tory or ambiguous, one can only speculate that if the Crowley cov-
enant had been more restrictive, such as the Belle Terre ordinance,
it may have been upheld and interpreted to preclude the establish-
ment of group homes.
Other jurisdictions have supported the establishment of group
homes by finding that group homes fall within the parameters of
"family" as defined by the ordinance or covenant. 0 7 This has been
achieved by focusing on the use of the residence as a home, even
though such use did not comply in all respects with the traditional
meaning of the terms "home" and "residential purposes.' 1 08 In
Little Neck Community Ass'n. v. Working Org. for Retarded Chil-
dren,109 for example, a group home for mentally retarded children
was found to be consonant with single-family residential use even
though "family" was defined in a zoning resolution as "[n] ot more
than four unrelated persons occupying a dwelling, living together
and maintaining a common household."11o
In the eyes of the Little Neck court, the home was designed to
106. The covenant did not specifically foreclose use of the propery for commercial
uses, only for "noxious or offensive trade[s]." 94 Wis. 2d at 439-40, 288 N.W.2d
at 824.
107. See Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); Little Neck
Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383
N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1976); Hobby v. Family Homes of Wake
County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).
108. One court has stated:
While the analogy which plaintiffs seek to draw between a family
care home and a boarding house is intriguing, we find its forcefulness
to be unpersuasive. It is our opinion that while a family care home
does not comport in all respects with the traditional understanding of
the scope of the term "residential purposes," its essential purpose,
when coupled with the manner in which defendant seeks to achieve
its stated goals, clearly brings it within the parameters of residential
usage as contemplated by the framers of the restrictive covenant
which is at issue in this case.
The manifest purpose of the operation of the home is to provide
its residents with a family-like setting unlike that found in traditional
institutions for the care of the mentally handicapped. Furthermore,
no educational or vocational training of any kind is provided at the
home for the residents. Nor is any medical or nursing care provided
at the house. In virtually all respects, other than the mental capacity
of those who live on the premises, the house operates much like a
typical suburban household.
Hobby v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, 71-4, 274 S.E.2d 174,
179, 181 (1981).
109. 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1976).
110. Id. at 91, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
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emulate a biological family and to provide accomodations for a life-
style like any other traditional natural family might enjoy."' Little
Neck served to reinforce the holding of the earlier case of City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli,112 where a group home for ten foster
children was allowed. The Ferraioli court emphasized that the liv-
ing arrangements were to be permanent and were very much like
those of any household made up of a biological unitary family as
defined by the contested zoning ordinance."13 In both cases, emu-
lation of a traditional family experience was the objective, and, ex-
cept for the absence of a biological relationship, that endeavor had
been met.1 4 Such a relationship as the group home residents had
was a far cry from the type of arrangement that several unrelated
"normal" college students would have. Generally, group home res-
idents do not live together for mere convenience and financial ben-
efits as do groups of students or senior citizens. The latter groups
do not attempt to create a surrogate family relationship.
Some zoning ordinances define "family" as a "single house-
keeping unit,"l"5 without further explanation as to what that
phrase means. Courts have generally been quite liberal in their
interpretations of these ordinances. In Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay,116 for example, a group of
three priests and two lay brothers were found to fit within this
"family" definition. The rationale was that if the legislature had
desired to specifically define the word "family" to exclude those
persons unrelated by blood or marriage, it could have done S0.117
In Linn County v. City of Hiawatha,118 the Iowa Supreme Court
similarly held that a group home for six developmentally disabled
children met the definition of family as a single housekeeping
unit.119 The court noted that the group would function as any
111. Id. at 94, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
112. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d at 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
113. Id. at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453. The ordinance defined
family as: "[O ne or more persons limited to the spouse, parents, grandpar-
ents, grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers, or sisters of the owner or the
tenant or of the owner's spouse or tenant's spouse living together as a single
housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities." Id. at 304, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 451.
114. See Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Berger v.
State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
115. E.g., Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (1974); Linn
County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981); Costley v. Caromin
House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981).
116. 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954).
117. Id. at 615, 66 N.W.2d at 630.
118. 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981).
119. See also Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (1974);
Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health Center, Inc.,
156 N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (1978).
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other biological single family and that the children would partici-
pate in household duties as their disabilities permitted. Thus, they
were a family in every sense of the word except the biological
sense.12 0
While the cases discussed above would indicate that group
home proponents would have little difficulty convincing a court to
recognize the residents as a family within the definition of the ordi-
nance, at least one court has not been so persuaded.121 In Palm
Beach Hosp., Inc. v. West Palm Beach,122 a group home for ten
mentally retarded males was denied permission to operate in Flor-
ida. A city zoning ordinance prohibited more than five unrelated
persons from living together in any single-family dwelling. In de-
nying plaintiff's suit to enjoin the application of the ordinance to
the group home, the court held that the ordinance was not violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Concluding that the ordinance was rationally related to the le-
gitimate state objective of maintaining a family-oriented atmos-
phere in that district, the court declared that the ordinance was not
designed to discriminate against only retarded persons living in
group homes but operated equally against all groups of unrelated
persons. Thus, by relying on Belle Terre for support, the court up-
held the ordinance.
Another case where group home use was not allowed was Pe-
nobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer,123
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a proposed
group home for the mentally retarded did not constitute a single-
family use of the home. Use of Penobscot as authority for ruling
against such group homes is limited, however, because central to
the court's reasoning was the fact that staff members would not
necessarily reside at the group home.124 Therefore, the "domestic
bond" necessary for a traditional family-like structure was lacking
because there would be no central authority figure similar to a par-
ent residing in the home.125 Presence of such a figure in group
homes for the retarded is one of the factors that distinguishes the
homes from other facilities such as fraternities, halfway houses,
and rehabilitation centers for drug and alcohol abusers.
A case not as easily dismissed, where the operation of a group
home for handicapped persons was foreclosed, is Shaver v.
120. Id. at 100.
121. Palm Beach Hosp., Inc. v. West Palm Beach, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 18
(S.D. Fla. 1977).
122. 2 Mental Disability I Rep. 18 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
123. 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).




Hunter.126 In Shaver, the contested covenant restricted lot useage
to "residential purposes" only.127 The Shaver court ruled that such
a restriction did not merely restrict the type of structure to be con-
structed on a lot, rather the unambiguous purpose of the covenant
was to restrict the use of the property to single-family use.12 8 In
the opinion of the court, a group of four unrelated, single, handi-
capped women did not constitute such a single family.129 As a ba-
sis for its decision, the court relied on the definition of "extended
family" as set forth in a 1958 Texas case,130 defining family as "a
household, including parents, children and servants, and, as the
case may be, lodgers or boarders."131 The group of handicapped
women was not deemed to be a family under this definition.132
The Shaver decision is not easily reconciled with the trends
emerging in other states to view group home occupants as consti-
tuting a family. Group home proponents may argue that such a
narrow definition of family is modernly unrealistic and too restric-
tive because traditional family arrangements have greatly changed
since 1958. Additionally, public policy supports a broader defini-
tion. Conceding potential failure of these arguments, Shaver
should be restricted in scope as being an application of existing
Texas law, and not the trend of the law generally.
2. The Conflict Between Group Homes and Restrictions
Against Commercial Uses of Property
Homeowners have also contended that group homes are the
equivalent of boarding houses, clinics, or fraternities; and there-
fore, these homes have a commercial status rather than the status
of a single-family residence. As noted previously, this was one of
the arguments put forth by the Trendwood homeowners. One re-
sponse to this argument was stated in Linn County, where the
court noted that:
[T]he "compensation" paid by a boarding house resident to the owner
constitutes the primary purpose for the operation of a boarding house. By
contrast, the primary purpose of the foster home is to provide habilitation
for developmentally disabled children, and the Social Security payments
are merely a means of making it possible for the home to carry out that
purpose. Furthermore, residents of a boarding house normally do not in-
teract as a family, and they contract to receive nothing more than meals
and lodging in return for the compensation which they themselves pay to
the owner. On the other hand, the residents of the foster home would
126. 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App. 1981).
127. Id. at 575.
128. Id. at 576.
129. Id. at 577.
130. Southampton Civic Club v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1958).




seek to emulate family life, and through their interaction with the
houseparents and with one another, the children would receive benefits
beyond mere lodging and meals.1 3 3
The exclusion of commercial enterprise from residential dis-
tricts is a valid zoning objective, however, and some group homes
may be determined to be of a commercial nature. Reasons for
such a finding may be based upon deed restrictions, 3 4 or the mode
of operation and objectives of the home. 3 5 The critical determi-
nant appears to be whether the home is established on a simulated
family basis as opposed to a halfway house or mini-institutional
model. If the use of the property is deemed to be commercial by a
court, then both the single-family and residential restrictions have
been violated.
In Jayno Heights Landowners Association v. Preston,3 6 the
deed restriction limited the permitted occupancy of the residence
to one single-family unit, as follows:
Jayno Heights Subdivision No. 1, shall be used for residential purposes
exclusively, and no more then one single family dwelling house, with
usual outbuildings for use in connection therewith, shall be erected or
constructed on any lot in said subdivision and any residence so con-
structed shall be occupied by not more than one single family unit. 13 7
The term "family," however, was not specifically defined. At issue
was whether the establishment of a foster home for "normal" eld-
erly women was in violation of the single-family requirement. The
Jayno Heights court held that the property was actually being
used for commercial uses and not as a single-family dwelling. 3 8
In addition to rent, the residents paid for various domestic serv-
ices. The court noted that this arrangement was nothing more
"than a group of unrelated individuals sharing a common roof.' 3 9
Thus, to be safe from challenge on these grounds, a group home
must be carefully planned so that any indicia of a commercial ven-
ture is eliminated.
133. 311 N.W.2d at 100. The Hiawatha ordinance defined boarding house as "'[a]
building other than a hotel where, for compensation and by arrangement
lodging, meals, or lodging and meals are provided for three (3) or more per-
sons not transients."' Id. (quoting § 32.03, Hiawatha Municipal Code).
134. See Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271
N.W.2d 268 (1978).
135. See Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972) (not an
emulation of family home environment; owner called home a boarding
house).
136. 85 Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
137. Id. at 445, 271 N.W.2d at 269 (quoting the deed restriction).




3. Other Attacks on Restrictive Zoning and Covenants
If it appears doubtful that a group home will fall within the defi-
nition of "family" as stated in an ordinance or covenant, other legal
theories may be brought into issue. If a zoning ordinance is so re-
strictive and overly broad in application that it is not reasonably
related to any valid state objectives, it may be struck down as a
violation of due process requirements.140 However, if a substantial
relation to state interests is found and the ordinance rationally
promotes those interests, the ordinance will likely be upheld.141
Violation of the equal protection clause is also a potential argu-
ment available for use by mental health advocates. Although the
Belle Terre 142 decision prevents charges against single-family ordi-
nances of per se unconstitutionality, it is highly questionable
whether this would be true if the regulations were directed at dis-
abled persons specifically.143 However, mental retardation has
never been designated as a suspect class for equal protection anal-
ysis.144 Furthermore, arbitrary or invidious discrimination or dis-
criminatory intent must be shown before a court will consider
equal protection claims.145 If the ordinance does not affect the
mentally disabled any differently from any other persons unre-
lated by blood, adoption, or marriage, or no intent can be shown to
so treat them, then the ordinance does not arbitrarily or invidi-
ously discriminate. Therefore, a zoning ordinance that narrowly
defines family will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. 4 6
140. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. See also Berger v. State, 71
N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
141. See, e.g., Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14
(Me. 1981).
142. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
143. E.g., Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (zoning ordinance that
prohibited hotel registration of people requiring medical or psychiatric serv-
ices declared unconstitutional).
144. "[Wlhat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statutes as intelligence or
physical ability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). For a
viewpoint on why mental retardation should be classified as suspect see Ma-
son & Menolascino supra note 5, 162-63.
145. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
146. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). One legal writer explained
the equal protection analysis as follows:
First, under the 'minimum scrutiny' or 'rational relationship' test, the
ordinance will be upheld if the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that
there is no rational relationship between the ends sought and the
classification utilized in the ordinance. However, if the classification
is deemed to be inherently "suspect" or if it restricts the exercise of a
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Restrictive covenants are possibly protected from these consti-
tutional attacks. Although the Supreme Court in Shelly v. Krae-
mer' 47 established the policy against state enforcement of
discriminatory agreements, 48 most covenants restricting the use
of property to single-family residential use ban group homes as a
whole. Because nonfamilial groups of individuals may legitimately
be precluded from living together in an area,149 a covenant that
secondarily prevents establishment of group homes for the men-
tally retarded, merely because the mentally retarded are part of a
larger legitimately excluded group, possibly vitiates any four-
teenth amendment argument.150
Another possible rationale for refusing to judicially enforce re-
strictive covenants was employed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Crowley v. Knapp.151 The Crowley court stated that pub-
lic policy favored free and unrestricted use and alienation of
land.152 Therefore, strict construction of zoning ordinances is re-
quired to promote free use of property. On the other hand, the
United States Constitution purportedly prevents the states from
impairing private contractual agreements. 5 3 Thus, restrictive cov-
enants, which are a type of contract, should be upheld if the cove-
nants are clear, unambiguous, and not unconstitutional.5 4
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the contract clause
has recently enjoyed renewed popularity,15 and arguably could be
used by homeowners to successfully shield their neighborhoods
from group home infiltration when there are clearly stated cove-
nants prohibiting any such homes. 5 6
One group of mental health advocates has successfully argued
that the exclusion of group homes from a neighborhood constitutes
"fundamental right" the second tier of the test requires that the state
demonstrate a compelling interest in the establishment and mainte-
nance of such a classification.
Note, Recent Developmen4 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 19 ViL. L. REV.
819, 820-21 (1974).
147. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
148. Id. at 14. The Court refused to enforce a covenant that specifically banned
noncaucasions from owning property in a neighborhood.
149. See upra note 86-88 and accompanying text.
150. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1364.
151. 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
152. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
153. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides: "No State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " See Comment, supra note 5, at
1362-65.
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574
(Tex. App. 1981).
155. United States Trust. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
156. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1362-65.
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a violation of the right to travel.157 In Stoner v. Miller,'I8 a zoning
ordinance was declared unconstitutional because it violated the
rights of the mentally ill to travel freely. The ordinance prevented
persons requiring continuous medical care from living in hotels. 5 9
Prohibiting mentally disabled individuals from residing in group
homes in residential areas will result in the continuation of unnec-
essary institutionalization, the aggregation of group homes in
those neighborhoods that are receptive to them, or the establish-
ment of such homes in unsavory neighborhoods.60
Two other potential methods of evading zoning restrictions add
to the group home advocate's arsenal: the doctrines of sovereign
immunity and eminent domain. Many group homes carry out the
state function of providing services and are partially funded by the
state. The greater the degree of state involvement, the greater the
chance of invoking immunity.' 6 ' If the state acquired the property
directly, the power of eminent domain is applicable. 62 The laws of
the jurisdiction involved must be researched, however, to deter-
mine to what extent either of these doctrines is available.
VI. IS LEGISLATION THE ANSWER?
To date, twenty-three state legislatures have enacted legislation
that permits community group homes to be established in single-
family residential areas.163 Nebraska is among those states and
has formulated the policy of providing community facilities for the
mentally retarded. 6 4 Section 18-1745 of the Nebraska Statutes
157. Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); contra Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
158. 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
159. Id. at 178. The challenged ordinance provided that "patients requiring contin-
uous medical or psychiatric services shall not be registered [at hotels or
boarding houses]; [and] that such services shall not be provided by the pro-
prietor." Id.
160. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 2.
161. Many community homes are two steps removed from direct state control. An
agency is formed to supervise care of the disabled, and the agency contracts
with individual homeowners. Lippincott, supra note 27, at 775-77.
162. Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements For Re-
tarded Citizens: Parens Patriae Meets Police Power, 25 VLL. L, REv. 273, 302-
03 (1979-80).
163. Comment, supra note 5, at 1378.
164. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1141(1),(3) (1981) provides:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Ne-
braska that a pattern of facilities, programs, and services should be
available to meet the needs of each mentally retarded person so that
a mentally retarded person may have access to facilities, programs,
and services best suited to such person throughout the life of the
mentally retarded person. The complexities of mental retardation
require a coordination of the facilities, programs, and services of the
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states that a group home "may be established and operated in any
residential zone within the exercised zoning jurisdiction of any
municipality, except as limited in sections 18-1746 and 18-1747."165
Section 18-1746 prohibits close aggregation of group homes by pro-
viding that new group homes may not be licensed unless they are
located more than twelve hundred feet from an existing group
home.1 66 Section 18-1747 additionally limits the number of group
homes that may be established in any municipality.167
Even with state legislation providing for group homes, local
zoning laws and restrictive covenants may continue to pose
problems. Conflict between state and local law is not unusual.
This conflict was noted as a potential problem by the American
Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled in 1978,
when a model statute designed to secure the rights of the mentally
handicapped to live in the community was proposed.168 This fore-
cast of conflict between laws has been proven true in at least one
instance. In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association,169 the Ohio
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional those portions of Ohio's
Revised Code that provided for community facilities and were in
conflict with a restrictive local zoning ordinance.70 Therefore, al-
various agencies of the State of Nebraska and those of the communi-
ties. Programs and facilities should be planned and provided as part
of a continuum of service to mentally retarded persons.
(3) The purposes of the office of mental retardation shall be to as-
sist in the establishment and operation of community-based facili-
ties, programs, and services for the comprehensive diagnosis,
habilitation, care, training, transitional living, and recreation of per-
sons throughout this state who suffer from mental retardation....
165. NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1745 (Supp. 1982).
166. Id. Additionally, § 27,11.030 (b) (2) of the Lincoln Municipal Code provides
that group homes may be no closer to each other than one-half mile in dis-
tricts zoned R-1.
167.
Population Size of Community-Number Homes Allowed
1,000 or less One
1,001-9,999 One for every 2,000 residents
10,000-49,999 One for every 3,000 residents
50,000-199,999 One for every 10,000 residents
200,000 plus One for every 20,000 residents
NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1747 (Supp. 1982).
168. See ABA Project, supra note 39, at 9, 13.
169. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981). But
cf. Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977) (state stat-
ute enforced).
170. The court held that zoning ordinances were an exercise of the police power
that is specifically granted to municipalities. Thus, state statutes which pur-




though legislation at the state level is helpful, care must be taken
to ensure that it does not conflict with powers granted to munici-
palities by the state constitution.
Additionally, it must be noted that legislation, by itself, does not
assuage homeowners' fears and prejudices. Some curbs on who
may reside in group homes are necessary to reassure homeowners
that all of their concerns are not casually disregarded. Only
nonaggressive persons should be placed in homes; or, if a resident
is aggressive, he should have adequate continuous supervision.
Furthermore, a smaller group of residents more closely resembles
other families in the neighborhood. Family living should be emu-
lated as much as possible, with emphasis placed on the perma-
nency of residence (as opposed to the temporary arrangements of
many half-way houses).
Adequate staffing and supervision of the residents is impera-
tive. It follows that selective hiring of supervisory personnel is
also a necessity. A formal complaint system should be initiated so
that homeowners have a route by which to express any concerns
that arise after placement of the individuals in the home. Finally,
public education about the mentally retarded and publication of
information about successful group homes must be continually
ongoing. Only then will two competing points of view be recon-
ciled: normalization by placing the mentally retarded in the com-
munity, and the right to be secure in one's property in the type of
neighborhood that homeowners' relied upon when they purchased
their properties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the State of Nebraska supports the policy of providing
equal opportunities for community living to the mentally retarded,
the strength of that commitment may be curtailed if restrictive
zoning ordinances and covenants can be utilized to exclude group
homes. Courts have demonstrated a willingness to interpret such
regulations to not exclude group homes for the mentally retarded,
but there remains the possibility that communities or neighbor-
hoods may make their regulations increasingly specific so that
group homes may be excluded as a whole. Also, although the Ne-
braska legislature has enacted a law that allows group homes to be
established in any residential zone, that law is as yet untested.
Mental health advocates are anxiously awaiting the Trendwood
appeal. If the Nebraska Supreme Court rules that covenants re-
stricting residential areas to single families are interpreted to ex-
clude group homes, the state's efforts will be thwarted. If,
however, the court takes the view that a group home is included in
the definition of "family" for all purposes of restrictive covenant
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interpretation, then the deinstitutionalization process mandated
by Horacek will continue. It is clear that the trend of the law calls
for the latter decision. Residents of group homes live in a family-
type setting and call the dwelling their home. The fact that the
house-parents are paid to live there does not make the home a
commercial operation such as a boarding house. There is a rela-
tive permanence to the group home arrangement that differs from
the transitory aura associated with halfway houses and fraterni-
ties. An additional public policy factor that supports the allowance
of group homes for the mentally retarded in the community is that
they have nowhere else to go to observe the "normal" role-models
that are needed for their habilitation. This is not as important a
factor in the establishment of halfway houses, fraternities, and
boarding houses. Thus, because the mentally retarded have no-
where else to go for the normalization process, the disallowance of
community group homes would effectively foreclose much of the
opportunity for normalization.
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